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DECLARATORY RELIEF IN INSURANCE
COVERAGE DISPUTES
BY JOSEPH F. CUNNINGHAM

I

n the fairly recent decision ofAl/state Insurance Co.
v. Atwood,1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland pro-

vided claimants, insurance carriers, and their attorneys guidance as to when a carrier might seek judicial
interpretation of policy language related to the facts in the
course of a policy coverage dispute. Indeed, some would
suggest that this case posits the most precise guidelines for
seeking such relief anywhere. The issue is a particularly
topical one for reasons that will be discussed. Its resolution
in Maryland contrasts sharply with the course taken by the
highest courts of other states. Practitioners will find the
court's decision by Judge Eldridge for a unanimous court
both logical and persuasive. Interestingly enough, a contrasting Virginia decision, Reisen v. Aetna Lifo & Casualty
CO.,2 if less scholarly, raises interesting policy questions
which bear further thought. Other appellate courts are
divided along lines set out in these two leading decisions and
a review of both suggests the parameters of the topic.
Atwood is the latest in a significant line of cases in
Maryland dealing with the problem of the appropriate time
for an insurance carrier to raise the issue of policy coverage
in cases where an underlying dispute involving its insured
suggests conduct facially outside the scope of the policy's
terms and conditions. While this issue has been frequently
presented to courts over the years, the increase in coverage
litigation generally and the ingenuity ofcounsel for claimants
and insureds seeking to fit claims within the ambit of policy
coverage have significantly increased the pace of such decision-making by courts. This increase has forced development of procedural ground rules covering the topic over the
past twenty years.
A landmark decision in this area, both in Maryland and
nationally, is Brohawn v. Transamerica Insurance Co. 3
There, the court of appeals spoke definitively in a number of
areas involving insurance policy rights and obligations. The
decision indicated, infer alia, that a carrier owed its insured
a complete legal defense to claims that suggest even a
possibility of being covered under the four corners of policy
language. The case further stands for the proposition that a
conflict of interest between the carrier and its insured, once

developed, 4 obligates the carrier to provide separate counsel
of the insured's choosing to the insured at the carrier's
expense. Finally, the Brohawn court held that an insurer
ordinarily could not obtain a declaratory judgment concerning policy coverage where the coverage issue to be determined was essentially the same as an issue to be decided in
the pending tort case. Atwood, fifteen years later, then
undertook to determine precisely when this type of early
declaratory relief might be appropriate. This inquiry had
some guiding precedent which arose in the wakeofBrohawn.
For over a decade after Brohawn, there had been a series
of decisions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland that
seemed to back away from its general prohibition of carriers
seeking early declaratory relief in instances when they believed underlying disputes involving their insureds were
outside the scope of policy coverage. Carriers persisted in
seeking redress through declaratory judgment by fastening
on language in Brohawn that, where policy coverage "questions are independent and separable from the claims asserted
in a pending suit by an injured third-party,'os such claims
could still be resolved by means ofdeclaratory judgment. As
the court in Atwood noted, a number of decisions were made
in the interim which permitted anticipatory rulings on coverage before the underlying suit was tried. The Atwood court
did not indicate, of course, the degree of confusion felt by
many attorneys arising from the manner in which cases after
Brohawn fudged the "independent and separable" standard
to the point where it was often guesswork as to when a carrier
might properly file suit to determine a coverage issue involving a pending case.
The Atwood court cited Brohawn's reference to disputes
between a carrier and its insured in determining whether the
insured had given the insurer adequate notice of an underlying claim to preserve policy rights and/or whethetthe insured
had cooperated with the insurer in defending a claim or
refused to pay premiums. Such issues are fit for a declaratory ruling prior to the trial of an underlying tort case.
Conceptually, it makes sense for a court to initially resolve
these kinds of questions because they involve, not interpretation of policy coverage, but rather policy exclusions.
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These questions relate to facts clearly "separable" from
issues likely to arise in thir4-party claims against an insured.
The harder questions of independence and separability related to coverage language in a policy were presented by the
cases Northem Assurance Co. v. EDP Floors, 6 St. Paul Fire
& Marine Insurance v. Prysesld,7 Truck Insurance Cycle v.
Mark's Rentals,8 and Bankers & Ship Insurance v. Electro
Enterprises. 9
In these related cases, it appeared that the clear line drawn
by Brohawn had significantly blurred. This may have been
due to the highest Maryland court's second thoughts with
regard to whether the near-prohibition ofprompt declaratory
relief to carriers in cases involving seemingly obvious
noncovered acts nonetheless obligated the carriers to provide
their insureds a complete defense. The Atwood court, in a
footnote, suggests that a look at St. Paul Fire & Marine
Insurance v. Prysesld cited previously will clarify which
coverage issues are separate and which are not separate and
independent from issues in pending tort suits. IO However,
this clarity, as a studied review of Prysesld will show, is far
from apparent. Indeed, Prysesld created more confusion
than it eliminated for commentators and practitioners alike.
The reason is simply that this case also seemed to suggest
that, contrary to Brohawn, declaratory actions to determine
the existence of policy coverage generally might lie prior to
resolution of the underlying suit involving the insured.
Atwood, like Brohawn, concerned a mixed bag of allegations involving intentional and negligent wrongdoing. Thus,
it permitted the court of appeals to voice the propriety of
having the underlying litigation proceed before any coverage
issues were resolved. At the same time, the Atwood court
wisely alluded to the reality that clever attorneys for both
plaintiffs and defendants in underlying suits, in an attempt to
make possible the availability of insurance proceeds, were
styling and accepting pleadings artfully coined as "negligent
sexual molestation," "negligent rape," and "negligent sodomy." The court adverted to the risk of fraudulent pleading
and tactics "in order to manipulate insurance coverage,"
where the particular parties' interests are best served only
when "a jury return [s] a verdict finding that even the most
... blatant criminal and/or intentional acts [to be] negligent
conduct. "11 Upon refusing to permit insurers to intervene in
the underlying dispute as an obviously interested party, the
court concluded such intervention would be mischievous by
putting an insured to the defense of its position as to the
plaintiff in the underlying case and also as to the insurer
seeking to prove intentional wrongdoing. 12 The court further
stated that permitting the carrier to intervene would run
counter to the long-standing prohibition on direct action suits
involving insurers before the liability of an insured is decided. 13 The court was also reluctant to permit the issue of
insurance to be presented to a jury when the acknowledged
prejudicial impact ofsuch information had traditionally been
excluded from jury consideration in Maryland. 14
4
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Nonetheless, while emphasizing its dislike for pre-trial
declaratory litigation by insurers, the court of appeals went
on to spell out procedural rights for insurers challenging their
obligation to pay judgments and related costs should its
insureds not prevail in the primary case. It permitted insurers
to subsequently litigate any coverage issue they chose,
despite an adverse judgment against their insured. yet, it
required that such suit be filed within ten days ofthe entry of
judgment in the tort suit. IS
The trial judge must then determine as a matter of law
whether or not the issue resolved at the underlying trial to
determine coverage was fairly litigated. If so, the second
proceeding ends. If not, then the insurer must present
evidence as to the absence of such fairness and, ostensibly,
the circumstantial reality of whether or not policy coverage
exists. It seems unclear as to why a two-step process is
required here while a single hearing, preceded by briefing,
should normally suffice to resolve the fairness issue. But the
court, in permitting a trial judge to take an extended look at
the coverage question, has permitted more.
Regardless, the decision has an analytical consistency in
dealing with a thorny problem which should provide fairness
to both sides in this kind of increasingly frequent dispute. It
will be interesting to observe the impact of such ruling on
future insurance-related tort litigation, both with respect to
volume and complexity.
The Supreme Court of Virginia chose a different course
a fewyears earlier in the previously mentioned case ofReisen
v. Aetna Lifo & Casualty Co. Rejecting Brohawn and other
similar decisions from foreign jurisdictions, the court simply
concluded that the existing Virginia declaratory ju4gmentact
allowed a carrier who could show the existence of a justiciable controversy to promptly pursue disposition of such
controversy before its insured's tort trial. Not persuaded by
the Brohawn line ofcases, but citing none to the contrary, the
court instead relied upon general language from a 1941 tome
by one of the draftsman of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. 16 It then suggested that the carrier's acknowledged duty ofgood faith owed to its insured, in responding to
a plaintiff's settlement demand in the tort suit, clearly
obligated it to resolve the coverage question promptly (a
duty, no doubt, the insured would happily waive). While
such rationalization may seem feeble, a reading of the case
displays the sense that the court was outraged that "unscrupulous litigants" would disregard the facts and falsely allege
claims to set up an insurer to assume policy obligations. The
opinion seems to imply that common sense dictates no
judicial dalliance with these preposterous "negligent rape"
type pleadings l7 and their prompt adjudication as a quick
purgative for such mischief.
However, before dismissing as overbroad the approach
taken by the Supreme Court of Virginia, it is worth considering some policy reasons that favorably weigh on the side of
the Reisen approach. First, the availability of prompt

resolution of the coverage issue, as the court suggested,
undoubtedly has a tempering impact on meritless pleadings
and subsequent trial tactics in the insured's tort suit. Additionally, any inclination towards fraud implicit in "negligent
rape" style pleading, in combination with lowering ofpublic
respect forthe judicial process and its potential subversion of
which the Atwood court warned, is stymied.
Rapid determination of policy coverage questions should
also favor settlements in cases similar to Reisen where the
court quickly establishes a lack ofcoverage and, thus, defines
certain limits on a defendant's "deep pockets." This approach contrasts with the delayed adjudication approach of
Atwood where a carrier, doubting coverage exists, will
ordinarily not entertain any settlement proposals. An initial
determination that a policy lacks coverage may well eliminate a number oftort suits against defendants who are clearly
uninsured for the wrongs claimed, thus arguably promoting
judicial economy.
Finally, perhaps an up-front ruling as to coverage provides an insured a degree ofcertainty as to its position at trial
ofthe underlying dispute and the finality ofa judgment in the
dispute, which the Atwood approach denies. While the
Reisen court never articulated these considerations, they
clearly suggest themselves.
Other courts have addressed, with varying degrees of
sophistication, the timing of a declaratory judgment in the
context of supposedly applicable exclusions under an insurance policy. In Travelers Insurance Co. v. Emery,IS the
Court of Appeals of Florida may have provided the most
recent and, perhaps, the most practical approach. There, the
carrier appealed a lower court's decision denying its complaint for declaratory relief as premature because no suit had
yet been filed against the insured. The insurer contended that
a "business pursuits" exclusion in its homeowner's policy
applied and, therefore, terminated any duty to defend the
insured against a third party in the prospective litigation
growing out of a business related claim. 19 The Emery court,
upon review, fell in line with the letter and spirit ofthe holding
ofthe Supreme Court ofVirginia in Reisen. Citing American
Fidelity Fire Insurance Co. v. Johnson,20 the court wrote,
"the better part of wisdom should have dictated . . . the
resolution ofthe question of ... liability to the insured under
the claimed renewal of the policy by the simple expedient of
a declaratory judgment proceeding, at the inception of the
litigation.'~1 The court ruled that the coverage issue was
separate from the negligence issue in the threatened litigation
and that the lower court erred in adjudging the petition
"premature" despite the absence of an existing suit against
its insured. 22
California, conversely, at least at the intermediate appellate level, seems to have flatly refused to allow an insurance
company to maintain any declaratory j udgment action against
an insured while the main action is still pending. In United
Services Automobile Ass'n v. Martin,21 the insurer sought

declaratory reliefdue to the insured's failure to cooperate, as
required by the policy. In Maryland, Virginia and most other
states, such preliminary action would clearly be permitted
because resolution of the applicability of the cooperation
clause is obviously a separate matter from any underlying
litigation. In California, however, the lower court sustained
a demurrer to the amended complaint seeking a declaratory
judgment and dismissed the action. The insurer appealed.
The Court of Appeals of California, upon review, ruled that
a required showing of prejudice could not be made while the
main tort action was pending, thus making its outcome
uncertain. Consequently, declaratory relief against the insured was inappropriate at that time. 24 One can only ponder
the fairness and wisdom of a judicial mandate that demands
proof of prejudice as a pre-condition to a carrier even
proceeding in such cases to seek declaratory relief. 2S
. Ohio also recently reviewed the propriety of an early
declaratory judgment action in a case where an underlying
dispute involving the insured with third-parties suggested
conduct facially outside the scope of a policy's terms and
conditions. In so doing, it has embraced the other pole of
absolutism in dealing with this type ofdeclaratory action. In
Preferred Risk Insurance Co. v. Gill,26 the insurer sought a
declaratory judgment that it did not have to defend or
indemnify its insured in an unresolved, pending civil lawsuit
arising out ofa murder perpetrated by the insured. The lower
court ruled in favor ofthe insurer that it had no duty to defend
or indemnify the insured. However, the court of appeals
reversed in part, ruling that the insurer must defend the
insured when negligence is alleged because such negligence
was covered. The insurer moved to certify the record.
Pursuant to Transamerica Insurance Co. v. Taylor' and
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pikiner,28 Ohio courts
previously followed the rule that the duty to defend was not
a proper subject for a declaratory judgment action.29 Nevertheless, upon review, the Supreme Court of Ohio took the
opportunity to reexamine the rule of law set forth in Taylor
and, despite two judges dissenting, reversed the lower court's
decision. Relying on Farm Bureau Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co. v. Hammer,30 and ignoring the more sweeping
and more recent holding in Reisen, the court cited an "ethical
dilemma" which an insurer supposedly faces in its duty to
defend when the insured's own conduct arguably takes it
outside the coverage ofthe policy. 31 The court then ruled that
consistently permitting the insurer to bring preliminary declaratory judgment actions may eliminate this perceived
ethical predicament by relieving the insurer of any duty to
defend despite the potential coverage mandated by the pleading.32 .
Such emphasis on "ethical" concerns by the carrier
seems misplaced at best. Surely the issue is simply one of
contractual duty. The Ohio court has traveled from one pole
to the other in a short period oftime on the present topic and,
at least in this last instance, simply used judicial fiat to open
23.1 I The Law For u m
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the court room door to early resolution of coverage issues. conflict exists, see Cardin v. Pacific Employers Ins. Co., 745 F.
Based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that divergent Supp. 330 (D. Md. 1990).
paths have been followed by the respective jurisdictions in 'Bl'Ohawn, 276 Md at 405, 347 A.2d at 848.
dealing with the topic of litigation timing involving insur- 631 Md. 217, 533 A.2d 682 (1987).
7292 Md. 187,438 A.2d 282 (1981).
ance coverage questions. The comparative increase or
'288 Md 428418 A.2d 1187 (1980)
decrease in pretrial suits by insurance carriers in the refer- 9287 Md. 641, 415 A.2d 278 (1980).
enced states may provide the ultimate answer as to the better IOAtwood, 319 Md. at 252 n.2, 572 A.2d at 162 n.2.
course. Reflection on the "all or nothing" approach of the IIId. at 253, 572 A.2d at 157 (quoting Petitioner's Brief at 15,
Ohio and California courts is interesting for its divergence, Atwood).
but hardly for the subtlety of the reasoning displayed by 12Atwood, 319 Md. at 257, 572 A.2d at 159.
either. Conversely, it is apparent that the Court of Appeals 13Id
ofMaryland in Atwood has provided sophisticated, albeit far 14Id at 258,572 A.2d at 159.
from perfect guidelines for declaratory reliefto carriers that, uSee the filing requirements in Md. R P. 2-532, 2-433, or 2-534,
for fairness and analytical precision, other state courts might as appropriate.
16Reisen, 302 S.E.2d at 533.
well consider. It surely can be said to be the leading case on
l7Jlere, the insured had driven his truck on to a sidewalk to injure
the subject presently.
a person with whom he was having an argument. The resultant
claim was for negligent and intentional conduct.
About the Author: Joseph F. Cunningham, Esquire, 18579 So.2d 798 (Fla. Dist. App. 1991).
specializes in Civil Litigation and Insurance Law with his 19Id. at 799-800.
Washington, D.C., law firm of Joseph F. Cunningham & 20177 So.2d 679 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
Associates. Mr. Cunningham received his J.D. in 1960 from 2lEmery, 579 So.2d at 801 (emphasis added).
Columbia University. He is admitted to the Bar in the 22Id. at 802.
23
120 Cal. App. 3d 963, 174 Cal. Rptr. 835 (1981).
District of Columbia, the United States Supreme Court,
24Id.
at 836.
Maryland, and Virginia. His contribution to the Low Forum
23lt
may
be argued that the prejudice bar to early declaratory
joins his lengthy list of published articles.
judgment relief applies only to California disputes involving the
cooperation clause in a policy. The case does not, however, limit
Endnotes
its holding to this provision.
Copyright 1993 Defense Research Institute, Inc. Portions of
26507 N.E.2d 1118 (Ohio 1987).
this article were published in the Febnwy 1993 issue of For
27 504 N.E.2d 15 (Ohio 1986).
The Defense.
28
321 N.E.2d 600 (Ohio 1974).
1319 Md. 247, 572 A.2d 154 (1990).
29Taylor, 504 N.E.2d at 17.
2302 S.E.2d 529 (Va. 1983).
30
177 F.2d 793 (4th Cir. 1949).
3276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 842 (1975).
]IGilI, 507 N.E.2d at 1122.
4For a recent, insightful analysis of how far the separation of 32Id
interests between a carrier and its insured may proceed before a
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